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HIPSTER ANTITRUST: NEW BOTTLES,
SAME OLD W(H)INE?
BY CHRISTOPHER S. YOO1
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Antitrust appears to be in the midst of a transition into a new era. The number of jurisdictions with active enforcement programs has risen dra-
matically in recent years, and competition law authorities around the world are ramping up their efforts. The advent of the digital economy has 
supported the rise of large high-tech enterprises that now dominate lists of the ten largest companies in the world. At the same time, the populist 
wave that is transforming politics in countries all over the globe has provided a platform for advocates on both the left and the right who have 
long been skeptical about big business and large institutions to argue for more vigorous enforcement.
In the midst of these developments, a recent outcry over what is sometimes called “Neo-Brandeis” or, more often and more colorfully, 
“Hipster Antitrust” has come to the forefront. In short, proponents of this new movement advocate abandoning the consumer welfare standard 
that jurisdictions around the world have embraced as the definitive benchmark. They would abandon the efficiency-based approach that focuses 
on low prices, high quantities, and high quality in favor of one that focuses on the absolute size of firms, the level of industry concentration, 
injuries to small business, and other more amorphous goals, such as wealth redistribution, political power, and employment. The commotion has 
prompted Senate hearings and statements by members of Congress, extensive commentary from leading antitrust practitioners, and academic 
conferences devoted to the topic.
Much as every generation thinks it has invented sex, the Hipster Antitrust movement is sometimes discussed as if it represents something 
brand new. A brief look back at the intellectual history of antitrust reveals that the current controversy is more properly regarded as another 
iteration of what has become an old debate. The bottles may be new, but the wine still tastes the same.
The contours of this debate are well documented in the antitrust literature, outlined quite nicely in Michael Jacobs’s 1995 historical sur-
vey. During the 1970s and 1980s, antitrust populists waged an unsuccessful war against the growing dominance of the economic approach to 
antitrust and attempted to preserve the Warren Court jurisprudence that regarded large firm size and industry concentration as inherently prob-
lematic without any need to analyze the impact of particular business practices on consumers. They faced a vigorous academic critique showing 
that large size may well be the product of economies of scale inherent in a particular industry or from being a more efficient competitor. As the 
consumer welfare standard became entrenched in judicial decisions, the academic literature, and agency practice and guidance documents, 
populist criticism “took on a frantic tone” and eventually “grudgingly acknowledged the success” of the consumer welfare approach. By the end of 
the 1980s, the debate between the populist and the economic approaches “ha[d] lost its drama,” and “[t]he victory of a purely economic analysis 
. . . could hardly seem more complete.”2
Gone were the days when big was regarded as inherently bad and when small firms were protected for their own sake. Instead, firm size 
was relevant only to the extent that it benefitted or harmed consumers. Herbert Hovenkamp has noted that the problem with applying standards 
other than consumer welfare is that the goals:
are unmeasurable and fundamentally inconsistent, although. . .their contradictions rarely exposed. Among the most problematic 
contradictions is the one between small business protection and consumer welfare. In a nutshell, consumers benefit from low 
prices, high output and high quality and variety of products and services. But when a firm or a technology is able to offer these 
things they invariably injure rivals, typically those who are smaller or heavily invested in older technologies. Although movement 
antitrust rhetoric is often opaque about specifics, its general effect is invariably to encourage higher prices or reduced output or 
innovation, mainly for the protection of small business or those whose technology or other investments have become obsolete. 
Indeed, that has been a predominant feature of movement antitrust ever since the Sherman Act was passed, and it remains a 
prominent feature of movement antitrust today. Indeed, some spokespersons for movement antitrust write, as Louis Brandeis did, 
as if low prices are the evil that antitrust law should be combatting.3
2 Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 219, 221, 228, 236–37, 239–40 (1995). For acknowledgements 
by prominent populists of the dominance of the economic approach, see, e.g. Lande, Implications of Professor Scherer’s Research for the Future of Antitrust, 
29 WashbuRn L.J. 256, 258 (1990) (recognizing that “the dominant paradigm today is that the only goal of the existing antitrust laws is to increase economic 
efficiency”); Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CoRnell l. Rev. 1140, 1140 (1981) (conceding that “[r]egard for efficiency is in the 
ascendancy”).
3 Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 notRe Dame l. Rev. (forthcoming 2018), draft available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3097452.
3CPI Antitrust Chronicle April 2018
www.competitionpolicyinternational.com
Competition Policy International, Inc. 2018© Copying, reprinting, or distributing 
this article is forbidden by anyone other than the publisher or author.
It thus comes as no surprise that during this period, the Supreme Court embraced consumer welfare as the appropriate standard under 
the Sherman Act.4 The emergence of a consensus that economic analysis should dictate the contours of antitrust did not, of course, mean the end 
of all controversy. As anyone who has worked with economists knows, agreement that consumer welfare is the goal of antitrust still leaves a great 
deal of room for differences of opinion. During the 1990s and 2000s, these disputes took place between the largely price-theoretic approach of 
the Chicago School and the more game-theoretic approach of the post-Chicago School. More recently, antitrust has taken a more empirical turn. 
It would be a mistake, however, to regard these disputes as a rehash of the old fight between the economic and populist approaches. Instead, 
these arguments took place within a shared commitment to consumer welfare as the proper antitrust standard. In the words of Carl Shapiro, 
Berkeley business professor and former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, 
“If ‘Post-Chicago Economics’ stands for the notion that . . . antitrust should move away from promoting efficiency and consumer welfare, count 
me out.”5
The continuing support for the consumer welfare standard was evident at the December 13, 2017, hearings held by the Antitrust Sub-
committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on “The Consumer Welfare Standard in Antitrust: Outdated or a Harbor in a Sea of Doubt?” While 
one of the speakers advocated abandoning the consumer welfare standard, the other three disagreed, including those who generally favor more 
vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Diana Moss of the American Antitrust Institute, one of the leading organizations arguing in favor of ramping up antitrust enforcement, stat-
ed that her organization “has always held the view that the antitrust laws are fundamentally durable and the consumer welfare standard is fully 
capable of meeting the challenges of the modern economy.” She cautioned that “remaking the antitrust laws or replacing the existing consumer 
welfare standard would throw the enforcement agencies, private plaintiffs, and the courts into disarray.” She then traced enforcement actions 
taken under the consumer welfare standard, concluding that “[t]hey support the notion that the standard capable of taking on the challenges 
we face moving forward” and that “[t]he consumer welfare standard is able to tackle the manifestation and exercise of market power in these 
settings.” In short, any problems with antitrust lay in the vigor with which it has been enforced, not in the consumer welfare standard itself.6
Shapiro similarly endorsed the consumer welfare standard and rejected concluding that a firm harms consumers simply because it has 
obtained a dominant position. He further stated:
During the 40 years that I have been studying and practicing antitrust, there has been a broad consensus among antitrust scholars 
and practitioners in favor of the “consumer welfare” standard. No evidence whatsoever has been put forward calling this consen-
sus into question. Indeed, I know of no serious antitrust experts who favor abandoning the “consumer welfare” standard, and no 
workable alternative has been proposed.7
If one moves beyond the academy to examine actual enforcement practices, the debate has followed a very similar trajectory with respect 
to the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) Section 5 authority to prevent actors from engaging in “unfair methods of competition.”8 From time 
to time, FTC Commissioners and staff have debated whether to wield this power as a standalone authority to redress conduct that does not rep-
resent a violation of the antitrust laws, even conducting hearings on the issue in 2008. Indeed, such a position draws support from a line of old 
4 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (“Congress designed the Sherman Act as a consumer welfare prescription.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). For the Court’s most recent pronouncement, see FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (“The point of antitrust law is to 
encourage competitive markets to promote consumer welfare.”).
5 Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63 antitRust l.J. 483, 484 (1995).
6 The Consumer Welfare Standard in Antitrust: Outdated or a Harbor in a Sea of Doubt?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Antitrust of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 115th Cong. 5–6, 8, 9 (2017) (statement of Diana Moss, President, American Antitrust Institute), available at: https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
download/12-13-17-moss-testimony.
7 Id. at 3–4 (statement of Carl Shapiro, Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy, Walter A. Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley), 
available at: https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/12-13-17-shapiro-testimony.
8 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
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U.S. Supreme Court cases, some of which are acknowledged to be wrongly decided even by advocates of more expansive Section 5 authority,9 
as well as passing mentions in more recent decisions as well.10
To say that the FTC’s Section 5 authority is not confined to the strict contours of antitrust law as laid out in the Sherman Act is not to say 
it is unbounded. A trilogy of cases from the 1980s and a 1994 case in which the courts rejected the FTC’s efforts to exercise its standalone 
Section 5 power stand as a cautionary note.11 The court’s discussion in the Ethyl case, in which the FTC attempted to reach consciously parallel 
pricing that in the absence of an agreement, is instructive. Given that “the term, ‘unfair’ is an elusive concept, often dependent upon the eye of 
the beholder,” the court noted the Supreme Court’s warning in that “appropriate standards must be adopted and applied to protect a respondent 
against abuse of power.” Without such standards, “the door would be open to arbitrary or capricious administration of § 5.” Consequently, “the 
Commission owes a duty to define the conditions under which conduct” constitutes unfair competition under Section 5 “so that businesses will 
have an inkling as to what they can lawfully do rather than be left in a state of compete unpredictability.” Thus, even though Section 5 authority is 
not limited to the metes and bounds of the Sherman Act, courts have not authorized treating it as a roving authority in the hands of the FTC. In-
stead, it is limited to “conduct which, although not a violation of the letter of the antitrust laws, is close to a violation or is contrary to their spirit.”12
The admonitions of the Ethyl court resonate to this day. The need for limiting principles has led those who support expanding Section 
5 authority beyond the strict letter of the antitrust law to insist that it be applied in a manner consistent with the economic approach. A classic 
example is Robert Lande’s statement at the FTC’s 2008 workshop on Section 5 that “if the Commission tried to have an expansive reading of 
Section 5. . ., but did not do so in a way that was clear and was bounded, then the Supreme Court would today restrict Section 5. . .to the other 
antitrust laws. And this would especially happen if the Commission interpreted Section 5 in a way that was non-economic.”13
Herbert Hovenkamp’s article on The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act provides another apt illustration of this point. While 
he supports the limited use of Section 5 to reach practices that fall outside of traditional antitrust, he insists that the condemned practice “really 
be ‘anticompetitive’ in a meaningful sense. That is, there must be a basis for thinking that the practice either does or will lead to reduced output 
and higher consumer prices or lower quality in the affected market.” Thus, he supports the use of Section 5 to reach cartel-like behavior, such 
as conscious parallelism, that has clear negative implications for consumer welfare despite the fact that it lacks the agreement necessary to 
violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the market power needed to violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act. He cautions, however, against using 
Section 5 to attack monopoly in its incipiency in the absence of a dangerous probability of economic harm, penalizing companies simply because 
they are large will likely benefit “small independent retailers, . . . not consumers.” He also raises concerns about using the Section 5 power to 
mimic the European doctrine of abuse of a dominance, arguing that such cases should be limited to situations in which “the harm to completion 
[is] apparent.” He closes by reminding us that Section 5 “must not be interpreted to undermine competition goals, which are high output of high 
quality products and low prices.”14 His support for applying the Section 5 power thus clearly falls within the consumer welfare paradigm and 
should not be regarded as an endorsement of a return to the approach that penalized firms simply for being large.
9 See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966); Atl. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367 
(1965); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 708 (1948); Fashion Originators’ Guild 
of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463, 466 (1941). For the concession that certain cases were wrongly decided, see Dahdouh, Section 5, the FTC and Its Critics: 
Just Who Are the Radicals Here, Competition: J. antitRust & unfaiR Competition l. seC. st. baR Cal., Fall 2011, at 1, 15–16 & n.85.
10 See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 762 n.3 (1999); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986).
11 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (Ethyl); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 1980); Official 
Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1980); FTC v. Abbott Laboratories, 853 F. Supp. 526, 535-36 (D.D.C. 1994).
12 Ethyl, 729 F.2d at 136–37, 138, 139; accord FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (noting that the FTC’s Section 5 authority “is particular well 
established with regard to trade practices which conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actually 
violate these laws” (emphasis added)).
13 Transcript, Fed. Trade Comm’n Workshop, Section 5 of the FTC Act as a Competition Statute 87 (Oct. 17, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/
transcript.pdf.
14 Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 fla. l. Rev. 871, 878, 879–82, 884, 893 (2010).
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The Ethyl court’s admonitions about the importance of clearer guidance to giving companies that are potentially subject to Section 5 are 
reflected in a recent speech and law review article published by then Commissioner and now Acting Chairman Maureen Ohlhausen. She reviews 
uncertainty surrounding the FTC’s past efforts to implement Section 5’s mandate against unfair trade practices and proposes a framework for 
providing public guidance regarding the agency’s enforcement policy with respect to standalone Section 5 cases.15
In short, to experienced observers of antitrust, the current uproar about hipster antitrust has the familiar ring of a debate that both sides 
thought had been long settled. The new bottles do not hide the fact that the wine is the same, and the same vinegary flavor that led to its rejection 
a generation ago remains. Although complaining about large companies has always had a certain appeal in some quarters and may have new 
appeal in others, mere slogans and epithets do not represent an adequate substitute for reasoned analysis. This is particularly true in the digital 
economy, which has yielded specular economic growth and value and in which the need for large investments in R&D and other features of the 
market may necessitate the existence of large firms if consumers are to enjoy these benefits. Moreover, the classic nirvana fallacy reminds us 
how easy it is to point out the flaws of one approach while foregoing any close examination of the proffered alternative, which no doubt suffers 
from flaws of its own that may be even greater. The absence of a coherent alternative to the consumer welfare standard thus limits the serious-
ness with which complaints about it are taken. All of these considerations are framed by the backdrop that vague standards open the door to 
political manipulation and abuse and that enforcement authorities around the world typically watch U.S. antitrust law closely and often take cues 
from how it develops. They underscore the importance of avoiding the seduction of basing legal changes on mere demagoguery and insisting 
that any reforms be based on a solid analytical foundation.
15 Ohlhausen, Section 5 of the FTC Act:  Principles of Navigation, 2 J. antitRust enfoRCement 1 (2014); Ohlhausen, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Re-
marks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Section 5: Principles of Navigation (July 25, 2013), available at: https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2013/07/
section-5-principles-navigation.
